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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FDWFNA NIELSEN and the STATE OF
UTAH, by and through UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

No. 14628

- v STEVEN HANSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants, State of Utah and Edwena Nielsen, appeal
from an order rendered against appellants in the District Court
of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
granting respondent's Motion to Dismiss and thereby barring any
action to establish paternity and support due co-plaintiff's minor
child.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following the filing of defendant's amended answer, the
court dismissed the action based on defendant's claim that the
statute of limitations had run.

The court held that the action

was controlled by Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22.
RELIFF SOUGHT Ol': APPFAL
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's order holding that establishment of paternity and liability to support does
not exist unless the action is cornrnenced within eight years and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
request that this
case be remanded and the complaint reinstated
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

so as to permit the processes of the court action to take place.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The co-plaintiff, Edwena Nielsen, gave birth to a
child out of wedlock on August 6, 1964.

On February 2, 1965,

the defendant, Steven f'ansen, signed an "ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY AND SUPPORT AGFEEMENT;" but because said acknowledgment was
never presented to the court for judicial approval, no order of
paternity exists.
port of the child.

At no time did the defendant provide for supSoon after the acknowledgment was signed,

plaintiff, in reliance thereon, went off public assistance.

Co-

plaintiff Nielsen subsisted on her own resources until 1975,
when, because of defendant's neglect and other circumstances,
she was again forced to rely upon public assistance from July
through October of that same year.
On November 10, 1975, plaintiffs filed a complaint
against defendant alleging the failure of the defendant to support Steven Eansen Junior as required by Utah Code Annotated
78-45-3 and defendant's willful refusal to reimburse the State
of Utah under Utah Code Annotated 78-45-9 for assistance rendered co-plaintiff.

The State of Utah sought judgment against

defendant for support and maintenance of his dependent.
In defendant's answer of December 11, 1975, both
paternity and duty to support were denied.

Following defend-

ant's amended answer of April 26, 1976, the lower court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations found in Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-2may contain errors.

POINT I
A FATHER OWES THE SAME DUTY OF SUPPORT TO
BOTH LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.
At common law a bastard was said to be "filius nullius,"
the child of nobody, or "filius populi," the child of the people.
In essence, the illegitimate child had no father known to the
law.

"Illegitimacy was considered disgraceful, and a bastard

was disqualified from certain offices."

10 Am. Jur. 2d 848-849.

Most states have since mitigated more or less the rigors of
the common law and conferred upon illegitimate children rights
which that law previously denied.
In Armijo v. Wesselius, 73 \')ash. 2d 716, 440 P.2d
471 (1968), the court held that the words "child or children"
in a wrongful death statute meant that the death action was
for the benefit of decedent's wife, husband, "child or children" which included illegitimate as well as legitimate children of deceased parents:
"The reason for this trend is clear.

Society is

becoming progressively more aware that children deserve proper
care, comfort and protection even if they are illegitimate.
The burden of illegitimacy in purely social relationships
should be enough, without society adding unnecessarily to the
burden with legal implications having to do with the care,
health, and welfare of children."

-3-
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Utah law is clearly in line with the modern
trend which recognizes that all children need and deserve
proper care.

Under Utah Code Annotated 78-45 (a) (1) of the

"Uniform Act on Paternity," the father is liable "

to

the same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock
. for the education".
of the child."

and "necessary support . .

In further clarifying the exact meaning

of the above cited statute, one must turn to the companion
statutes to understand the intent of the law.
Annotated 78-45-3 states:

Utah Code

"Every man shall support his wife

and his child." (Emphasis added.)

"Child," as defined under

Section 78-45-2(4), "means a son or daughter under the
age of twenty-one years and a son or daughter of whatever
age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without
sufficient means."(Emphasis added.)
Even before the enactment of the above quoted statutes, this court has long recognized the absolute nature
of the father's support duty:

a father has "a positive

duty to support his minor child. "
P.2d 262, 107 U. 239 (1944).

Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153

In Rockwood v. Rockwood, 236

P. 457, 65 U. 261 (1925), this court stated that "the duty
of the father to support his children, if he is able to do
so, is imposed in this state by positive statute.

It

would be his duty in any event if there were no statute upon
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the subject."

In a more recent case, Rees v. Archibald,

6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P.2d 788

(1957), this court said:

"This court has invariably emphasized
the father's obligation to support his
children based upon the elementary principle that the law imposes upon those who
bring children into the world the duty to
care for and support them during their
minority and dependency." (Emphasis added.)
Given the continuing nature of a father's duty of
support and the legislative grant of equal rights to education and necessary support to all children (78-45a-l, supra)
it is doubtful that the legislature intended that the rights
of the illegitimate child to such support should forever be
barred merely because an action has not been brought within
eight years as held by the lower court.

The right of the

illegitimate child to be supported by its father as opposed
to that of the legitimate child would hardly be the same
if abrogable by a statute of limitations which runs during
the child's minority and bars an action to establish paternity
and enforce the support duty.
POINT II
TO BAR A PATERNITY ACTION BY A CHILD, PARENT,
OR PUBLIC AGENCY DURING THE CHILD'S MINORITY
IS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
AND OF THE RIGETS AlJ ILLEGITIMATE CHILD HAS
FOR SUPPORT.
Children born out of wedlock have the same rights
to support, education, and necessities as those born through
legitimate channels.

The laws of the State of Utah recognize

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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all children whether legitimate or not as equals.

To buy

the position of the lower court does away with this recognition of "equality" and once again places on a child "after
eight years" the stigma of the early common law of being
"filius nullius" if an action has not been brought in that
time period.

To take such a position removes from society

the progress made in the recognition of rights and becomes
overt-rank discrimination against a child who had no say
in its conception, birth, or early life.

Much too often, a

young child does not know the legal, moral, societal implications until several years beyond what the court has held
is the tLme for the action to COEl.Il\ence.
The United States

Supre~e

Court entertained ques-

tions on the rights of illegitimate children as compared to
those of legitimate children in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535, 93 S. Ct. 872

(1973), and drew the following conclusion:

"
. . Once a state posits a
judicially enforceable right on behalf
of children to needed support from their
natural fathers, there is no constitutionally
sufficient justification for denying such
essential right to a child simply because
/the7 natural father has not married /Ehe7
mother, and such denial is a denial of equal
protection. "
What are these "judicially enforceable" rights?
First of all, the duty of support was discussed in point oM
of this brief.

Rees v. Archibald, supra, specifically spells

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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out this duty as does Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-l and 78-45-1,
et seq.

Further, the Colorado Supreme Court said as stated

in Garvin v. Garvin, 108 Colo. 415, 118 P.2d 768 (1941):
"The primary liability of the father to his minor child always exists during minority." (Emphasis added.)
Need the "judicially enforceable" rights under
Utah law be any clearer to fall under the mandate of Gomez?
No.

There must be equality in the application of the right

to support.
wise.

The lower court in the case at bar feels other-

The obvious inequality is seen in this case.

If the

child in question had been born of a marriage with a "known"
father, that child would be able to call upon that father
for needs and support through its entire minority.

However,

under the logic of the lower court, if the parent, guardian,
public agency, or child does not bring an action within eight
years, the child is forever barred from claiming any familial
relationship to one he could call father.
What the lower court in effect has done is say
that an illegitimate child has an equal right to its father's
support only where suit has been brought on its behalf
within an eight-year period, whereas the legitimate child's
right to support extends through its entire minority regardless of any attempt to bring suit to enforce the support obligation.

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The defendant based his motion to dismiss on the
fact that "an essential purpose of the statute of limitations
is to avoid putting a defending party in an untenable position.

Here, the defendant claims the benefit of the stat-

utes because it is, as a practical matter, impossible for
him to adequately prove a defense."

Although there may be

problems in defense, the Supreme Court has nonetheless held
in

~,

supra, that once the right of support has been

granted "there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such essential right.

.

Such a de-

nial constitutes a "denial of equal protection."
There is no indication that the legislature intended
that there be any exception to the general rule of support.
Further, mere problems of evidence would hardly justify discrimination between children when dealing with their essential right to support.

Policy aside, it is the plaintiff

who has the burden of proof and whose task will become increasingly difficult with the passage of time.

Defendant's

apprehension in regard to evidence is not sufficient reason for denying children the right of support from their
natural f athers--not to mention the interests of the state
and its taxpayers.
If the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children are to be equal, an illegitimate must at all times

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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during its minority be granted the right to prove paternity
either by iself or through its mother or agency charged with
its care.

Otherwise, the illegitimate child's right to sup-

port depends solely on the diligence of its mother or guardian, whose failure to act would, at an early age, reduce
him to the status of welfare recipient and deny him forever
the right to enjoy the economic benefits and social rights
belonging to its legitimate counterparts.
That a state may not invidiously discriminate
against illegitimate children by denying them substantial
benefits accorded children generally is firmly supported by
case law.

A state may not, for example, create a right

of action in favor of children for the wrongful death of a
parent and exclude illegitimate children from the benefit
of such a right.
1509 (1968).

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct.

Nor may illegitimate children be excluded from

sharing equally with other children in the recovery of workmen's compensation benefits for the death of their parent.
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct.
1400 (1972).

Where, as in the instant case, a continuing

right to support has been created for all children, a complete bar to action resulting from failure to prove paternity
within eight years discriminates unfairly against illegitimates.

As stated by the court in New Jersey Welfare Rights

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 622, 93 S. Ct. 1700 (1973):
" . . . imposing disabilities on
the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility and wrongdoing."
Thus, this court should not make it more difficult
for illegitimate children to live in our society than it
already is.

Very few children know the significance of what

this controversy centers around at the age of eight.

There-

fore, not only should this court protect the rights of the
illegitimate child who had no control over its circumstances
but should permit the person or agency broad lee-way to use
the available laws for the benefit of the child.

Ofttimes,

the mother of an illegitimate child becomes incensed at the
fact that she has become pregnant and despises the natural
father for many years.

Should this fact be a bar to the

mother bringing an action when she realizes there is some
material and psychological benefit to the child?

To say so

would deny to such children a sacred right of parentage and
would discriminate against them because of something they had
no control over.
POINT III
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 78-12-22 IS NO BAR
TO BRINGING PATERNITY ACTIONS, BUT IS
MEANT TO BE A STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF ESTABLISHED COURT ORDERS
OF SUPPORT.
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The lower court, in its final order, based the
disTI1issal on the belief that Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22
(as amended) controlled paternity actions.

The pertinent lan-

guage is as follows:
"--Within eight years:
An action upon a judgment or decree
of any court of the United States, or of
any state or territory within the United
States.
An action to enforce any liability
due or to become due, for failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent
children."
(Emphasis added.)
The purpose of the above statute, as seen by the
appellants, is not to completely bar the bringing of a
paternity action to "establish familial relationships" but
limits only an obliger's liability for support up to eight
years after a sum certain has been ordered or decreed.

The

statute must be read in light of the intent of the law--to
allow support for dependents.

The language "liability due

or to become due" was added in 1975 to codify the position
this court took in Seely v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1975).
In that case, the mother was awarded custody of a minor child
and defendant was ordered to pay $40 per month for its
support.

The defendant failed to abide by the support or-

der and a subsequent action to enforce the order was initiated by the \·:oman.

His arrearage was $5,800 for twelve

years and one month.

Although no action was brought

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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within eight years, this court did not hold that the child
had lost all right to enforcement of that liability upon
the amount which was due or to become due; instead, the
court held that defendant's liability on the arrearage was
limited to arrearages accumulated within a period of eight
years--i.e., $3,840 (96 x $40).
The court in Seely, Id., quoted Simmons v. Simmons,
105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528

(1943), as follows:

"When a judgment is rendered, payable
in installments, the statute begins to run
against the judgment from the tir:\e fixed
for the payment of each installment for the
part then payable." (Emphasis added.)
The above language demonstrates that the application of Utah
Code Annotated 78-12-22 is limited to actions brought to enforce judgments, orders, or decrees of the court that fix
sum certain amounts for support.

Failure to bring an action

on this liability due or to become due does not totally
eliminate a minor's right to receive support payments from
its father.

Instead, it serves to limit the liability due

to an eight year period.

Thus, a minor would not be barred

from bringing an action beyond the eight year period but
would be barred from collecting the amounts due beyond the
statutory limitation.
Appellants are quick to point out, however, that the
eight year statute does not control support obligations in
paternity matters.

The Uniform Paternity Act has specific

of provided
reimbursement
necessary
Sponsored by the provision
S.J. Quinney Lawfor
Library.limitation
Funding for digitization
by the Institute ofof
Museum
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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expenses before the date paternity is established.

The

eight year statute of limitation on liability would not begin
to run until the liability is fixed by court order.

Until

then, the shorter statute of four years preceding the action controls.

Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-3 states:

"--The father's liabilities for past
education and necessary support are limited
to a period of four years next preceding
the commencement of an action." (Emphasis
added.)
It would seem only logical from the above language
that actions for support can be brought beyond the four years
"next preceding" the commencement of the action.
the phraseology would be meaningless.
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22.
amounts due on sums certain.

Otherwise,

The same applies to

That language limits only the
Since the Paternity Act con-

trols the collection of necessities, limiting it to four
years, the thrust of both statutes is to leave entirely
alone the matter of "when" a paternity action can be brought.
The opinion of the lower court which denies the
natural mother, public agency obligated to provide its care,
and the child itself to bring actions after an eight year
period has gone by does not align itself with Utah law which
provides that support goes until age 21.

The Maine Supreme

Court had a similar situation before it in Earding v.
Skolfield, 125 Me. 438, 134 A. 567

(1926).

There, a pater-

nity suit was filed when the illegitimate child was 13 years
-13-
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old.

The court held the suit to be timely and said the

statute of limitations was no bar to the action because such
an obligation is a continuing one and is not over in the
number of years claimed under the statute of limitations.
This court should take cognizance from the above
case.

Just like the period of liability for support--8

years--is a shifting time period, so is the period for establishing paternity.
to 21.

In the State of Utah, that period goes

Whether the moving party is the child, the woman or

the public agency makes no difference.

The entire purpose

of either of the aforementioned parties bringing an action
is to establish a familial relationship for the child and
have the father of the child support it as do the fathers
of children born legitimately.

By prohibiting one of the

above named persons to establish paternity for the benefit
of the child, it is totally inconsistent with the intent and
meaning of the law.

To permit the action secures for the

child social security benefits of the father,
compensation, inheritance, etc.

industrial

To deny this is a judicial

decree declaring that the child "SHALL ALWAYS REMAIN A
BASTARD."
POINT N
ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH PATITu'UTY ARE NOT CONTROLLED
BY EXISTING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. THE ACT
ITSELF WAS PURPOSELY SILEN""T THEREON, AND IT WAS,
THEREFORE, ERROR FOR THE I.1Jh1ER COURI' TO HOW THAT
THE ACTION WAS SO CONTOOLLED.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Despite the continuing nature of a father's support
obligation, the defendant argued in his amended answer that
11

[A]n essential purpose of the statute of limitations is to

avoid putting a defending party in an untenable position."

He

further argued that because no statute of limitations is found
in the body of the Uniform Paternity Act, the four year bastardy
limitation was applicable.
false assumptions.

With this, the defendent makes two

First, he falsely assumes that the civil

action to establish paternity is governed by any statute of limitations.

Secondly, he falsely assumes that the limitation under

the bastardy statute applies to the Uniform Act.
Although defendant does have a legitimate concern regarding his defense, the mere passage of years goes to the
weight of the evidence and must, as in most cases, be resolved
by judge and jury.

Obviously, the longer a plaintiff's delay,

the more difficult his burden of proof will become.
by the court in Ortega v.

As stated

Portales, 134 Colo. 537, 307 P.2d

193 (1957):
"The infant child cannot be deprived of
its right to continued parental care and support
by failure on the part of any person to act within
a limited time following its birth. The lapse of
ti~e may add to the difficulties of proof concerning the essential facts upon which liability may
depend, but this does not mean that the pertinent
facts cannot be judicially determined."
In regard to defendant's first false assumption, the role
of Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22 has already been discussed.

As indi-

cated in that discussion and alluded to here, the Uniform Act on
Paternity contains no specific limitation period.

Had the state
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legislature intended to place a time li.citation upon the bringing of
such an action, it wa..ild rave specifically so provided.

Primary p.irpose

Since the

of a paternity pr=eeding is to secure the support

anJ. education of the child rather than to µmi.sh the father, it only

follows that the legislative intent was to ensure that the child would
rave the right to support during its entire minority.
been recognized in Utah case law.
Roe~,

This has long

This court said, in Rockwood v.

supra:
"The duty of the fat.her to support his
children • . . is imposed in this state by
positive statute. It w:mld be his duty in any
event if there were no statute upon the subject."

And, in Rees

v. Archibald, supra:

"This court has invariably emphasized the
father's obligation to support his children based
upon the elEmentary principle that the law imposes
upon those who bring children into the \\Orld the
duty to care for and support thEill during their
minority and dependency."
In Rees, Id., this court held that a divorce decree did

not affect the defendant's responsibility for his son' s support and the
expenses of care given him.

In arriving at this holding, the court

chose tra.t rule of law which gave " . . . primary consideration to
the rights and needs of the children."

Thus, Utah law appears to

follow the rule that the obligation of a father to support his child,
legit:i:rrate or illegitimate, is continuing and terminates only when the
child reaches its majority under a provision of the divorce decree or
paternity order, or 21 years under Utah Code Annotated 78-45-1, et
seq., if the decrees or orders are silent or if there are no orders.
To apply a statute of limitations not s:::iecifi cally provided for by
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escape his continuing obligation to support "his" child if his child
it "is. II
10 Am. Jur. Trials 678-679 discusses the bastardy statutes
and the evolution of the fact that the Uniform kt on Paternity had no
limitations.

In that discussion is found a definitive statement regard-

ing the lack of a statute of limitations under tli.e Uniform Paternity
Act:

"The original bastardy statutes, creating a new
cause of action, usually establisherl a specific and
quite short period of time within which the action
could be brought. In most cases the running of the
statute starterl with the birth of the child, and the
action by the mother had to be brought within a period of fran one to three years. Some statutes stipulaterl tii.at an action could be brought by the local
agency when the child was or was likely to becane a
public charge. If there was any limitation on the
bringing of such action, the statute usually did not
begin to run until the child did becane a p..iblic
charge.

Usually the statute was tollerl by written acknowlerlgment of paternity or by the furnishing of support.
The written acknowledgment must have been unequivocal
and the payment of support reasonably regular, not
merely sporadic.
Many i f not all of the state laws continue to
reflect such provisions. However, as the views of
society in respect to the resfX?nsibility of the
father changerl,
after statutes were enacted making it a crime for the father wilfully to fail to
support an illE:gitimate child, the theory evolved
that each day's failure to support constituterl a new
crime; thus, for all practical p.rrposes the statute
would never run.

ana

This view is also reflecterl in some of the modern
paternity statutes. The Uniform Paternity Act ms no
limitations on bringing the action, but recovery can be
had only for the necessary support supplied during the
four years next preceding the ccmnencanent of the action."
(Emphasis added.)
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Thus, for sanething ro imr;ortant, basic, and sacre::J. as
the establishnent of paternity, none of the existing "general" stat-

utes do or can apply.

____

The act itself, as indicated in Am. Jur. Trials ,

Id., specifically deleted the limitation because the drafters of tbat
law recognize:l this inherent right of the illegitimate.
This more enlightene:l view which canr;orts with the r;olicy
of Utah law giving " . • . pi:-imary consideration to the rights and
nee:ls of the children" has long been applied in other jurisdictions.
In State of Alabama v. Hunter, 67 Ala. 81 (1880), a bastardy proceerl-

ing 'Wherein no specific statutory limitation had been pi:-escribe::J. in
the bastardy statute itself, the court stated:
"We can see good reasons 'Why no starute
of limitations was pi:-escribed to bar such pi:-ocee::lings. They are chiefly intended for the public
indann.ity, and to coerce the putative father to
supr;ort and maintain the unforrunate child. "
In State v. Cordrey, 49 Del. 281, 114 A.2d 805 (1955), the father was

charge::J. with failure to support his illegitimate child.

The court

recognize:l non-support as a continuing crime:
" • . . The defendant in this case is
charged with non-supr;ort which the law recognizes
as a continuing crime. In crimes of this nature,
the starute does not begin to run fran the occurrence of the initial act, which may in itself e:nl:xx1y all the elenents of the crime, but fran the
occurrence of the most recent act. The duty to
supr;ort the child is a contin uing duty and
the failure to supr;ort it is a continuing offense,
and the parent will be subject to prosecution at
any time during the continuance of the wilful
neglect to supr;ort the child as provided by the
statute."
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A more recent case, State v. Christensen, 19 Ariz.
App. 479, 508 P.2d 366 (1973), held that a one year statute of limitations on actions on liability =eated by statute did not 1:er an
action by the mother against the alleged father which was brought
two years after the child's birth to determine paternity and cmcpel
support.

The Arizona court followed the policy enunciated in State

v. Nerini, 61 Ariz. 503, 151 P.2d 983 (1944), where, after observing
tllat the bastardy article did not contain sections limiting the time
in which the proceedings might be instituted, the court ccmnented:
"The statute is entirely free fran any
1:er of this kind, and indeed there should not be,
for the obligation of a father to support his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, is a continuing
duty against which limitation will not run during
the time the child needs such care and support. We
cannot conceive that the legislature ever intended
to limit the time in which such proceedings could
be instituted and prosecuted."
And, in State v. Johnson, 216 Minn. 427, 13 N. W. 2d 26 (1944) :

"The rule that the statute of limitations does
not run until the liability has ceased to continue
rests upon the principle that wh&e the obligation
is continuing in nature the breach or violation of
duty continues so long as the obligation continues,
and that the cause of action or penalty, as the case
may be, Iffilst be deaned to be continually accruing
during the entire time the obligation and the breach
thereof continue."
Regarding the second false assumption, not as much need be
said.

Utah COde Annotated 77-60-15 is a limitation of bastardy pro-

ceedings to 4 years.

It says:

"No prosecution under this Chapter ffestardff
shall be brought after four years fran the birth of
such child • • . " (Emphasis and Brackets added.)
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The defendant himself in his Motion to Diffiliss (R. 5) states:

"This

provision is limite:i to the chapter on bastardy."
If the legislature had meant for the four year stab.J.te

to apply to the Uniform Paternity Act, it v.ould have so indicate:i.
Furthermore, the more recent act, a Uniform Act, would not likely be
circumscribed by a state bastardy statute originally passed in 1911.
Also, Section 78-45a-3 would be rendered meaningless i f the four year

statute were to govern.

The language "corrrnencernent of

~action"

with

a liability limitation of four years thereon strongly implies that more
than one action could be brought--this being so, application of the four-

year statute would be incongruous.

surely, if the legislature and the authors of the Uniform
Paternity Act had wanted to limit the time withi.'1 which paternity could
be establishe:i either by the act itself or through use of the Bastardy
Act, they would have so provided.

A matter of such importance w:mld

not have been deleted without a good reason-that reason being that the
basic rights of all children and the duty of fathers to provide for
their support should not be subject to arbitrary, unjust limitations
which "-Ould bar the child fran exercising its rights to parental establishnent.
POilfl' V
IF ANY STATUTE OF LTI1ITATIONS IS FOUND TO
CONTROL, SAID LIMITATION IS TOLLED DURTh"G THE
CHILD'S MTh'ORITY AND AN ACT ION BROUGl:IT DURING
THE MTh'ORITY OF THE CHIW IS PROP.ER.
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Srould this court find that the eight year (or any other
length) statute of limitation controls paternity actions, such liroitations do not l:B.r the bringing of the action during the child's
minority.

l·i'hether the mother, child, or public agency charged with

the child's supp:>rt initiates and brings the action does not matter.
The "real" party in interest in all of the above sib.lations is only one
person--the child.
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-36 (b) (1) makes it clear that
the limitation :i:ieriod does not run during minority.

The pertinent

language is as follows:

"If a person entitled to bring an action
is at the time the cause of action accrued under
the age of majority the tin1e of su:::h disabi~is
not a part of the time limited for the corrmencanent
of the action." (Emphasis added.)
The present action fits this category exactly.

The child

was eight years and two days old when the ac tion was filed.
bas 10 years remaining for its minority.

The child

Pursuant to the al:x:>ve stat-

ute, the limitation of tirne is tolled until majority is reached.

How-

ever, in analysis of the foregoing, it is called to the court's attention that Utah Code A.'1Dotated 78-45a-2 allows the mother, public
agency, or child to bring the action in its own name, or together.

In

connection therewith, the child has a right to bring the action and,
thus, by the language of 78-12-36(b) (1), the period is tolled.
The argument undoubtedly will be raised that the suit is
brought in the name of the state and the mother and not that of the
child.

Therefore, since neither the state nor the mother are in their

minority, the statute of limitations should run.

Appellants \\Uuld like
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to resi;x:md to this in the following manner:
If this court agrees with the above provision, the mother
could i=etition the court to be appointe:l guardian-ad-litem.

In essence,

she is doing now in her own name the same thing she 'M:>uld do as a
"guardian-ad-litan," which is to pursue the interests of the child.
Further, as indicate:l previously, the "real" party, no matter wmse
name appears on the title of the action, is the "child" and not the
mother or the State of Utah.

Of course, the State 'M:>uld benefit

financially because of the fact that an establishe:l paternity 'M:>uld
pennit collection of support fran the natural father when the child is
on welfare.

However, the greater benefit derive:l directly by the

child greatly outweighs the few dollars collecte:l for welfare reimbursement.
The California Supreme Court, in Van Buskirk v. Todd, 269
Cal. App. 2d 680, 75 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1969), followed appellant's
position, above.

In that case, the mother of an illegitimate child

initiated an action to determine paternity through a bastardy action.
The court held that a bastardy action should be considere:l fran the

standpoint of the child as the real party in interest, and that the
statute of l:irnitations in the paternity phase of such an action is
tolled at all t:irnes from the birth of the child until his 1mjority,
or until an action for paternity is brought on his behalf.

The

court also stated that the tolling of the statute during the minority
of the child in question was not terminate:l by the bringing of an
e:irlier paternity-support action which was voluntarily disrrissed by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the child's representative.

The court analogized the instant case

to one in which a guardian ad liten volrmtarily discontinues an
action brought on behalf of an infant, and where the general rule is
that the rights of the infant are not prejudiced thereby, and that
he may still take advantage of his disability, the action not being
barred until the lapse of the statutory period after he becanes of
age.
Further, the same court reiterated its JX>Sition in 1971
when it decided Perez v. Singh, 21 Cal. App. 3d 870, 97 Cal. Rptr.
920 (1971) .

An attenpt to have the paternity action defeated by

laches was there encormtered by the court.

The court said that in an

action to establish the paternity of an illegitimate child and to obtain sup]Xlrt for that child, brought by the mother on behalf of the
child, the child is the real party in interest, and the statute of
limitations on the paternity aspect of the case is tolled during
the mincrity of the child.

The court stated that the obligation

of a father to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, is a continuing duty against which th e statute of limitations
does not run during the time that the child needs such support.
The court felt that the result v.Duld be no different i f the canplaint
was indeed considered to raise equitable issues, since the action
would be brought on the child's behalf, all benefits derived fran
it w:iuld belong to the child, and therefore laches could not be
imp.ited to the child during its minority.
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Appellants contend that the two preceding California
cases present the law this court should follow.

Since the right

to support does belong to the child and could, under the lower
court ruling, forever be lost through no fault of his own at the
age of eight years, the action should be considered from the
standpoint of the child as the real party in interest.

Where,

as in the instant case, the person is affected by a recognized
legal disability and a continuing duty of support exists, the
interests of the child and society must not be limited by an
arbitrary imposition of statutory limitation during a child's
minority.
Imposition of a statute of limitations would not only
be prejudicial to the child as the real party in interest, but
would also
taxpayers.

L~pose

an unfair burden on the State of Utah and its

In the instant case, all contact between the state

and the co-plaintiff ceased following the "ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
PATERNITY AND SUPPORT AGREEMENT."

Since the state acted promptly

on the matter of paternity and support after plaintiff again went
on assistance, the state should not be bound by the statutory lmi
tation.

The state should not be barred from establishing paternit

and seeking reimbursement for support rendered merely because a
woman does not go on public assistance until the statutory lirnita tion has passed.
CONCLUSION
The interests of illegitimate children should be of
great concern of this court.

In a day and age where more
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illegitimacy occurs, the natural fathers who indiscriminately
feel sex is a play toy should be required to support those children they bring into the world.

To prohibit this from taking

place, the taxpayers of this state will be called upon to support more and more children "whose fathers can hide behind the
technical cloak of the law."
It is appellants' position that the lower court must
be reversed and the complaint reinstated so as to allow discovery
processes to take place to determine the actual paternity of the
child.

There is nothing more basic to our society than to have

that right.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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